Privacy-Inclusive Financial Access Framework: Bridging the Privacy Divide in Digital Financial Services

Sam Smith

Maria sells fruit at a Nairobi market. When her husband became abusive, she tried opening a mobile money account to secretly save money to escape. But the Know-Your-Customer (KYC) requirements meant she had to use her national identification card, which her husband controlled, leaving her bankless. She is trapped, not because technology failed. This is just one theoretical example of how digital banking was supposed to solve the problem of financial access, but omits the margins. The reality is that 1.4 billion adults still don’t have a bank account, and those who do are increasingly forced to give up their privacy as the price of admission 1. Think about this number: over one billion people are not participating in the global digital financial ecosystem. In my researcher, I reviewed data from Kenya, India, Nigeria, and Latin America, in our research we found a pattern emerging: when marginalized communities (particularly affecting women, rural populations, LGBTQIA+ communities, refugees, the working poor, informal or migrant workers, sex workers, and many more) encounter the surveillance built into these digital financial systems, many choose to remain outside the formal banking sector entirely. These billion individuals are deciding that protecting their privacy matters more than accessing these financial services.

My findings challenge the basic assumptions about the current financial inclusion ecosystem. Banks insist they need extensive data collection for security and regulatory compliance, but these same requirements are creating barriers for the people who most need financial services. We’ve created a system that serves those with resources and alternatives, while effectively excluding everyone else. We need financial services that don’t treat privacy as a luxury good. Our research examines how a theoretical Privacy-Inclusive Financial Access (PIFA) Framework could document and quantify this trade-off, providing evidence for advocacy, rather than pretending technical solutions alone can resolve fundamentally political problems.

Existing Frameworks Ignore Privacy

Digital financial institutions often require customers to give out personal identifiable information in the form of government issued identification documents, biometric data (facial recognition or fingerprints), address and contact information, family members identity, source of funds, and ongoing monitoring of account activity; many of which marginalized individuals will not have 2, or are apprehensive to give out this information due to privacy and security concerns 3

If we look to history, it shows us that financial records can and have been weaponized against people across the globe. Nazi Germany’s use of banking records to identify and expropriate Jewish assets. McCarthyist blacklists enforced through financial institutions. Operation Choke Point targeting legal but “undesirable” businesses. Even in the present day, China’s Social Credit System links financial access to political compliance. All of these and more, are reasons enough for individuals to maintain their privacy in the financial sector and beyond. 

Current financial inclusion metrics systematically fail to capture privacy and security dimensions. The World Bank’s Global FinDex tracks that 79% of adults globally have financial accounts, yet never asks whether people control their financial data or understand how it’s used, either for or against them 4. The Alliance for Financial Inclusion Core Set focuses on availability, adoption, and traditional consumer protection without assessing surveillance impacts or data extraction practices 5. Similarly, the GSMA Mobile Money Metrics measure access and usage but completely ignore privacy considerations 6.

This measurement blindness reflects the interests of those who design these frameworks. In his book “Surveillance Gap,”  Michele E. Gilman argues the harms of extreme privacy and data marginalization disproportionately affects already vulnerable populations 7. The “Capability Approach”, developed by Amartya Sen 8 exposes this: financial inclusion should expand real freedoms and choices 9. Yet, when participation requires surrendering privacy, it becomes what Shoshana Zuboff terms “Surveillance Capitalism,” the extraction of human experience as raw material (data) for predictive products 10.

Privacy-Inclusive Financial Access Framework

The Privacy-Inclusive Financial Access (PIFA) represents a proposed measurement framework that would change how we evaluate financial inclusion by adding privacy as a core metric alongside traditional access indicators. This conceptual framework draws inspiration from Freedom House’s Democracy Index 11. PIFA posits that having a bank account may mean nothing if using it requires surrendering your privacy, paying premium rates for anonymous alternatives, or self-censoring transactions to avoid algorithmic discrimination. The framework would score financial systems across four dimensions: whether people can access services without excessive surveillance, if usage is genuinely voluntary or coerced by lack of alternatives, what privacy protections actually exist, and whether users have meaningful recourse when violated. Current financial metrics celebrate account ownership, while PIFA would reveal that many users may pay higher interest rates to avoid government surveillance, or that marginalized communities might systematically choose expensive workarounds or complete exclusion rather than submit to financial surveillance. PIFA would be a tool that aims to quantify the hidden trade-offs between financial participation and privacy, making visible the “privacy tax” on poverty and providing evidence that surveillance-based inclusion may not be real inclusion at all. When people reject digital financial services, they may not be acting irrationally or remaining unbanked by choice; they could be making a rational decision that privacy and autonomy matter more than the conventional benefits of financial inclusion.

The Four Pillars of PIFA

PIFA is basically a scoring system that shows the real cost of financial services, not just in money, but in privacy, dignity, and would expose when “financial inclusion” actually means surrender your privacy or staying poor.

1. Access with Dignity

PIFA would ask: What must you sacrifice to participate? Or, can people access financial services without surveillance? Instead of asking “Can you open an account?” 

This pillar measures:

  • Whether alternatives exist that respect privacy
  • How much personal information is required at each service level
  • Whether you can access services without surveillance
  • The degree of coercion versus genuine choice

Score range: 0 (total surveillance required) to 25 (privacy-preserving options available)

2. Quality of Use

PIFA would ask: Is usage voluntary or coerced? Do people self-censor transactions? Instead of counting transactions, PIFA evaluates whether usage is voluntary or forced.

This pillar measures:

  • Self-censorship rates (avoiding certain transactions due to monitoring)
    • Measuring this, unfortunately, relies primarily on observable behavioral proxies and sampling strategies
  • The premium people pay for privacy-preserving alternatives
  • Behavioral changes under surveillance
  • The difference between genuine adoption and forced participation

Score range: 0 (completely coerced usage) to 25 (fully voluntary participation)

3. Privacy Protection

PIFA would ask: Is data encrypted? Can users control their information? This entirely new dimension measures actual privacy safeguards.

This pillar evaluates:

  • Data control: Can users decide who sees what?
  • Technical protection: Is encryption available?
  • Consent quality: Can users give selective permissions, or is it all-or-nothing?
  • Transparency: Do users understand how their data is used?
  • Data minimization: Is only the necessary information collected?

Score range: 0 (no privacy protection) to 25 (full user control)

4. System Accountability

PIFA would ask: Do alternatives exist? Can violations be challenged? This measures whether the system provides recourse and alternatives.

This pillar examines:

  • Market competition (availability of privacy-respecting options)
  • Regulatory alignment (do privacy and financial rules work together?)
  • Democratic participation (can civil society influence policies?)
  • Remedy effectiveness (can violations be successfully challenged?)

Score range: 0 (no accountability) to 25 (robust oversight and alternatives)

How PIFA Scoring Works

Each pillar generates a score from 0-25 based on multiple indicators. The overall PIFA score combines all four:

  • 0-25: Surveillance-based exclusion (inclusion exists only through privacy sacrifice)
  • 26-50: Problematic inclusion (significant privacy trade-offs required)
  • 51-75: Improving inclusion (some privacy-respecting options available)
  • 76-100: Privacy-inclusive access (genuine choice with dignity maintained)

PIFA exposes what traditional metrics overlook. While conventional financial measurements celebrate success when people have online accounts, PIFA reveals the actual costs: the privacy, security, independence, dignity, autonomy, safety, or money that users sacrifice for access. The framework quantifies power imbalances by distinguishing between genuine choice and coercion, documenting situations where consent becomes meaningless because no real alternatives exist. This creates a standardized measurement system that allows objective comparison across countries, regions, and services, where a PIFA score of 75 carries the same meaning regardless of context. The framework also establishes accountability mechanisms: declining scores trigger investigations, disparities between populations expose discrimination, and improvements in privacy practices that raise scores become financially incentivized. At its core, PIFA’s innovation is straightforward but powerful. Rather than accepting the premise that privacy and inclusion must conflict, it measures precisely how systems manufacture this false choice, making these hidden trade offs visible and quantifiable for the first time.

The Math of Risk-Based Compliance:

Transaction Risk = (Amount × Frequency × Velocity) / (History × Verification Level) 
If Risk > Threshold: Require additional verification 
Else: Preserve privacy

Refute Against Privacy: Nothing to Hide Argument

The “if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear” argument fundamentally misunderstands both privacy and power 12. Everyone has legitimate reasons for financial privacy: medical expenses revealing health conditions, donations exposing political views, or payment patterns indicating sexual orientation or religious beliefs 13. But more critically, “nothing to hide” assumes today’s legal will remain tomorrow’s legal, ignoring how financial surveillance enables retroactive persecution 14. Women in Afghanistan had “nothing to hide” when they opened bank accounts, until the Taliban used that financial data to enforce economic exclusion 15. Chinese cryptocurrency traders operated legally until the government banned crypto and used transaction histories for prosecution 16. Even when activities remain legal, surveillance fundamentally changes behavior, PIFA would measure this self-censorship, documenting how people avoid mental health services, reproductive healthcare, or political donations not because these are wrong, but because they know they’re being watched 17. The framework recognizes that financial privacy isn’t about hiding crimes, it’s about preserving the autonomy to make legal choices without judgment, maintaining dignity in difficult circumstances, and protecting against future persecution by governments or corporations whose values may shift. When PIFA reveals that people pay premiums or accept exclusion to avoid surveillance, its quantifying a rational response to the reality that “nothing to hide” is a privilege that assumes your circumstances, government, and social norms will never change an assumption that history repeatedly proves false.

Conclusion

The Privacy-Inclusive Financial Access Framework represents more than a new measurement tool, it challenges the fundamental assumption that financial inclusion must come at the cost of privacy. By making visible the hidden trade offs that force 1.4 billion people to choose between financial participation and personal autonomy, PIFA exposes how current systems perpetuate inequality rather than solve it. The framework’s four pillars reveal that true financial inclusion isn’t just about opening accounts, but about preserving dignity, enabling genuine choice, and recognizing that privacy is not a luxury for the privileged but a fundamental requirement for human agency. As financial services become increasingly digital and surveillance-based, PIFA provides the evidence needed to advocate for systems that expand real freedoms rather than extract them as the price of participation. The question isn’t whether we can afford privacy-inclusive financial systems, it’s whether we can afford to continue excluding billions of people through surveillance-based models that mistake coercion for inclusion.

 

Footnotes

  1. World Bank Group, “COVID‑19 Boosted the Adoption of Digital Financial Services,” Feature story, July 21, 2022, World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2022/07/21/covid-19-boosted-the-adoption-of-digital-financial-services.

  2. Adolfo Barajas, Thorsten Beck, Mohammed Belhaj, and Samy Ben Naceur. (2020). “Financial Inclusion: What Have We Learned So Far? What Do We Have to Learn?” IMF Working Papers, Volume 2020, Issue 157 https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2020/157/article-A001-en.xml 

  3. Lal, T. (2021). “Impact of financial inclusion on economic development of marginalized communities through the mediation of social and economic empowerment.” International Journal of Social Economics. https://www.pingidentity.com/en/resources/blog/post/know-your-customer.html 

  4. Leora Klapper, Dorothe Singer, Laura Starita, and Alexandra Norris, The Global Findex Database 2025: Connectivity and Financial Inclusion in the Digital Economy (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2025), xxi. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/8b9002b6-d8dd-426c-aa7c-6d7d16902cd7

  5. Alliance for Financial Inclusion, “AFI Core Set of Financial Inclusion Indicators Policy Model,” December 2019, 19-20. https://www.afi-global.org/sites/default/files/publications/2019-12/AFI_PM_Core%20Set_FINAL_digital.pdf

  6. GSMA, “Mobile Money Regulatory Index Methodology,” March 2020, 7. https://www.gsma.com/solutions-and-impact/connectivity-for-good/mobile-for-development/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/MMRI-2020-Methodology.pdf

  7. Michele E. Gilman and Rebecca Green, “The Surveillance Gap: The Harms of Extreme Privacy and Data Marginalization,” N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change 42 (2018): 253-307. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1883/

  8. Kuriakose, Francis and Kylasam Iyer, Deepa, Understanding Financial Inclusion Through Deconstructing Human Development Approach and Capabilities Theory (July 8, 2015). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2609240 

  9. Kais Tissaoui, Abderrazek Hakimi, and Taha Zaghdoudi, “Can Financial Inclusion Enhance Human Development? Evidence from Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 11 (2024): article 573. https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/palcom/v11y2024i1d10.1057_s41599-024-03048-8.html

  10. Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2019), 8. https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=56791

  11. Freedom House. “Countries and Territories: Scores.” Freedom House. Accessed September 10, 2025. https://freedomhouse.org/country/scores

  12. Daniel J. Solove, “‘I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy,” San Diego Law Review 44 (2007): 745-772. https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol44/iss4/5/ and https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998565 Julie E. Cohen, “What Privacy Is For,” Harvard Law Review 126, no. 7 (May 2013): 1904-1933. https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-126/what-privacy-is-for/ and https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2175406

  13. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). https://nyuscholars.nyu.edu/en/publications/privacy-as-contextual-integrity

  14. Jonathon W. Penney, “Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 31, no. 1 (2016): 117-182. https://btlj.org/data/articles2016/vol31/31_1/0117_0182_Penney_ChillingEffects_WEB.pdf 

  15. “As the Taliban seized cities, they sent women home,” Al Jazeera, August 16, 2021 https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2021/8/16/as-the-taliban-seized-cities-they-sent-women-packing-home; “Afghanistan: Taliban Deprive Women of Livelihoods, Identity,” Human Rights Watch, January 18, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/01/18/afghanistan-taliban-deprive-women-livelihoods-identity 

  16. ​​“China: Central Bank Issues New Regulatory Document on Cryptocurrency Trading,” Library of Congress, October 13, 2021, https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-10-13/china-central-bank-issues-new-regulatory-document-on-cryptocurrency-trading/; “China jails traders for 5 years re Tether stablecoin FX,” Ledger Insights, December 19, 2024, https://www.ledgerinsights.com/china-jails-traders-for-5-years-re-tether-stablecoin-fx/

  17. Julie E. Cohen, “What Privacy Is For,” Harvard Law Review 126, no. 7 (May 2013): 1904-1933. https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-126/what-privacy-is-for/ and https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2175406